have come up with an idea that could be defined as the fertility of the negative. By is, oppose the resulting dominion, the obsession with acquisition, the purely instrumental and utilitarian attitude, and above all, the narcissistic drift of the modern subject (Pulcini, 2003; .
In this sense, I have been given precious input from the line of reflection, "'Oneself'," Bataille says, "is not the subject isolating itself from the world, but a place of communication, of fusion of the subject and the object" (Bataille, 1988: 9) . it is a death, is only the death of a certain kind of subject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of a fantasy of impossible mastery, and so a loss of what one never had. In other words, it is a necessary grief." (Butler, 2009 done by a series of authors who tend to underline and bring out the intrinsically relational and social nature of a subject that needs to be recognised by the other to obtain confirmation of its own dignity and identity (see Honneth, 1995; Ricoeur, 2005 instigate a transformation, to petition the future always in relation to the Other. It is also to stake one's own being, and one's own persistence in one's own being, in the struggle for recognition." (Butler 2004 ; on the topic see also Butler, 2005) .
This means that relations are not configured as a symmetrical relationship between two pre-constituted free and acting subjects, but as an "impingement" instigated by the other, an impingement that inaugurates the subject at the very moment in which its identity is expropriated, in which it is violated, causing its decentralization, its wound:
"the primat or impress of the Other is primary, inaugurative, and there is no formation of a "me" outside of this (Butler, 2005: 97) . Therefore, we must not simply oppose the idea of relationality to that of autonomy or sovereignty, but underline the effect of destabilisation and dispossession that relations with the other and dependence on the other produce in the subject, consigning it to a condition of vulnerability.
In both her texts, Butler comes back to this concept, originated by Lévinas Vulnerability is a primary, original 5 "but there is a more general conception of the human with which I am trying to work here, one in which we are, from the start, given over to the other […] , given over to some set of primary others" (Butler, 2004: 31) .
6 "Although I am insisting on referring to a common human vulnerability, one that emerges situation. So much so that Butler sees it as the sign of being human, of the constitutive and inescapable fragility of the human condition. 5 It is therefore something that we cannot avoid, something that "one cannot will away without ceasing to be human" (Butler, 2004: xiv) , whose origins we cannot trace, because it is coeval to the very origin of life, preceding the formation of the subject. 6 "That we are impinged upon primarily and against our will is the sign of a vulnerability and a beholdenness that we cannot will away." (Butler, 2005:100) 7 .
Even when this vulnerability becomes intolerable, when we are brutally reminded of it by being wounded and offended, we must avert every attempt to repress it or react to it violently, because this is where, we could say, the truth of being and the subject resides: the truth of relationships and the bond of reciprocity. Indeed, it is precisely when it reappears due to a failure, a defeat and the consequent pain, with life itself, I also insist that we cannot recover the source of this vulnerability: it precedes the formation of 'I'" (Butler, 2004: 31) .
7 See also (Butler, 2004: 45) : "What is prematurely, or belatedly, called the 'I' is, at the outset, enthralled, even if it is to a violence, an abandonment, a mechanism". constitute what we are, ties or bonds that compose us." (Butler, 2004: 22) . In other words, the experience of loss and failure can produce the narcissistic wound that permits the reawakening, in the Self, of the consciousness of one's own vulnerability and constitutive dependence. given over, beyond ourselves, implicated in lives that are not our own" (Butler 2004: 28) .
Hence, vulnerability is a resource, an "extraordinary resource" that the Self must grasp and make the most of in order to regain its relational nature and the sense of its being in the world. other human consideration is to eradicate one of the most important resources from which we must take our bearings and find our way" (Butler, 2004: 30) .
Periódico 
The challenge of difference: accepting contamination
Therefore, the notion of vulnerability seems to be an effective foundation, through the destabilizing power of the negative, for thinking of a relational subject; a subject aware of the 11 Here I propose a correction to Hirschmann's thesis (Hirschmann, 1977) , in which passions are fought with interests.
fact that the world is essentially, to use Jean-Luc Nancy's words, co-existence, "being-with" (être avec) (Nancy, 2000) . In the West above all, today the problem consists of the fact that the other is he who crosses our borders to become a close, internal presence, with whom we come into contact day in, day out. The other, the stranger (whether émigré, refugee or illegal immigrant) is now among us, he lives in our cities, he crosses our roads. The other can no longer be relegated to the outside, as the global age coincides with the disappearance of that separate and reassuring "elsewhere" to which we can confine those who threaten (or rather, who we believe to threaten) social cohesion. And neither does he come then go; on the contrary, he can increasingly be defined as Georg Simmel's figure of the "stranger within": "the person who comes today and stays tomorrow", as Simmel puts it (Simmel, 1950: 402) ; and who consequently cannot be expelled or assimilated as he has decided to endeavour to keep his own culture and tradition.
Thus, with his unavoidable proximity, the figure of the other is a perturbing presence challenging the Self's claim to immunity. And as a consequence he becomes the subject of negative projections by a Self that becomes entrenched in defending its identity by "inventing" an enemy to make a "scapegoat" for its own insecurity and fears. Therefore, this projective trend does not only concern single multicultural situations, but seems to affect the whole globe, where the tendency to identify the other as the enemy seems to be becoming increasingly pervasive and to be taking on increasingly bitter tones, so as to legitimize not only disastrous preventive wars, but also the success of misleading formulae such as the "clash of civilizations" (Huntington, 1996) . Not by chance is the strategy undertaken in this sense to rekindle those dynamics of de- So, first we need to unmask the deceit, at times concealed behind even the best of intentions, to prompt a process of (self-)criticism and deconstruction that shatters all claims to absolutization and identity autarchy. In this sense, it is not sufficient to appeal to liberal tolerance, and even less so to compassion and goodwill, since the intrinsic risk of this type of attitude is to keep the subalternity of whomever concerned intact; and therefore it is to deny the other, however unconsciously and unintentionally, of the status of subject. and understand its sense. Because, I must repeat, the emotions do reveal sense. Often prevailing is the prejudice that they are totalitarian and unchangeable, almost a sort of natural destiny that we cannot change; on the contrary, the emotions presuppose cognitive processes and evaluation, which we can modify and make change direction the moment in which we are able to give them a sense.
We need to exit the sterile alternative between refusal and tolerance, in order to accept the risk of the relationship with the other, putting our own passions and convictions at stake.
What is important is that the contingent character of our identity remains steady by recognizing our own difference within;
considering identity (our own identity)
something that is constantly fluctuating and developing: which means exposed to novelty, to the unknown, to the feeling of 
